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WHY STRATEGY MATTERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
Donald J. Reed 
 
“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the American colonel. 
The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment.  “That may 
be so,” he replied, “but it is also irrelevant.” 
  −Conversation in Hanoi, April 19751 
 
 
“We thank God for appeasing us with the dilemma in Iraq after Afghanistan.  
The Americans are facing a delicate situation for both countries.  If they withdraw 
they will lose everything and if they stay, they will continue to bleed to death.” 




The two statements above, separated by twenty-eight years of history, reflect the 
views of enemies who, unable to defeat the United States militarily, adopted 
similar long-term strategies of attrition to defeat instead the American national 
will. One had just defeated the United States, and the other has declared itself at 
war with the United States. In 1973, after more than ten years of conflict in 
Vietnam and Southeast Asia (at an average annual cost of sixty-one billion dollars 
a year in FY2006 dollars3 and more than 211,000 American casualties, including 
more than 58,000 American dead4) the Vietnam War ended in the United States 
suffering the first defeat in its history. It is difficult to grasp how a Western 
industrialized superpower could be defeated by an underdeveloped agrarian 
nation – with a fraction of its population and no gross national product to speak 
of – without accepting that the larger nation’s overall objectives and strategy in 
that war were flawed. The lesson of Vietnam, a war of policy and limited political 
objectives, is that while the United States military accomplished every tactical 
objective it set on the battlefield, in the end North Vietnam emerged strategically 
victorious.   
From a strategic perspective comparisons to the current war on terror are 
possible. After more than five years of conflict, with more than 28,000 American 
casualties (including more than 5,900 combatant and noncombatant deaths)5  
and a total cost that by some estimates could exceed one trillion dollars (thereby 
exceeding the cost of Vietnam),6 the United States finds itself involved in another 
war of limited objectives against non-state entities with extremely small 
memberships, no gross domestic products, and no national boundaries to defend. 
In the war on terror - the U.S. response to the al Qaeda attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 - the final outcome has yet 
to be determined and may not be decided for generations to come. Whether or 
not the United States will be able to apply the lesson of Vietnam to avoid a similar 
outcome in the war on terror remains to be seen. It is more certain that while it is 
possible to learn from past wars, each war is a special case and it is necessary to 
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focus on the task at hand.7 However, as with Vietnam, it is difficult to understand 
how an information-age superpower could be defeated by a non-state entity 
without accepting that the superpower’s overall objectives and strategy were 
flawed. For the nation to repeat its failure in Vietnam by achieving all its 
objectives in the war on terror, yet failing to achieve strategic success, would have 
grave consequences for both the United States and the international community. 
 
Premise 
In labeling its post-9/11 efforts the “war” on terror, the United States invoked a 
specific metaphor to galvanize the national effort. In doing so it has tied success 
or failure to the doctrinal rules of war.  Evidence of the war metaphor can be 
found in the opening words of the 2006 National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism: “America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement fueled by 
a radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder” [italics added].8 This article 
uses the metaphor to look at the war on terror from the vantage point of the new 
strategic reality facing the United States in the information age. It examines 
issues confronting the nation along five lines of inquiry: definition, doctrine, 
policy, strategy, and transformation. The United States will continue to confront 
these issues as it seeks to achieve success, or even to define success, in the war on 
terror. In this sense, these issues and United States’ efforts to achieve success are 
connected. 
In addition, the U.S. is confronted with a dynamic and evolving strategic 
environment, rather than the relatively static strategic environment that 
characterized the Cold War era. It has been said that while the United States 
continues to operate at the speed of doctrine, its adversaries are adapting and 
evolving at the speed of business.9 In this environment the future security of the 
U.S. will depend not only on how it deals with the present but also on how well it 
prepares itself for the types of warfare that will follow the war on terror in the 
information age. It can begin by approaching the situation in a manner similar to 
successes in past wars: with clearly defined and obtainable national objectives 
and a unified national strategy to obtain those objectives.  At the same time, the 
United States can establish a clear long-term vision for transitioning its efforts 
and its institutions from the industrial age to the information age as the new 
paradigm for waging war. Parameters for this new paradigm can be found in the 
strategic lessons from past wars, evaluated in terms of emerging concepts of 
warfare. 
For example, when the strategic reasons for the loss in the Vietnam War are 
considered in light of current efforts in the war on terror, parallels are evident.10 
The United States expended the majority of its strategic effort against the Viet 
Cong insurgency in South Vietnam, which it viewed as the main North 
Vietnamese effort. Although U.S. forces succeeded in destroying the Viet Cong 
insurgency, they did not thwart North Vietnam’s strategic objective of 
undermining American public support for the war. The United States was forced 
to withdraw from South Vietnam, leaving it open to conquest by conventional 
forces. It can be argued that the destruction of North Vietnam’s regular forces, 
which ultimately overran South Vietnam, should have been the main strategic 
objective of the United States.   
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In the war on terror, the United States is expending the bulk of its strategic 
military efforts against insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq (which can be 
viewed as fronts in the larger Global War On Terror11) and the global insurgency 
being waged by the al Qaeda terrorist network. However, the United States has 
not adequately defined the nature of its adversaries, nor its overall strategic 
objectives in the war on terror. Al Qaeda, on the other hand, has clearly stated its 
intent to bleed the U.S. economy as a means of weakening the American public’s 
support for the war. The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely not the 
main threat faced by the United States; it is far from certain that in its 
engagement against them the U.S. is winning the war on terror.   
The effectiveness of the military engagement in Iraq has come under scrutiny. 
One of the  conclusions of the Center for Strategic and International Studies is 
that the trends exhibited by the United States’ effort against the insurgency in 
Iraq indicate “cycles in an evolving struggle, but not signs that the struggle is 
being lost or won…There have, as yet, been [no] decisive trends or no tipping 
points: simply surges and declines.”12 This conclusion is further reinforced by the 
August 2006 Department of Defense Quarterly Report to Congress, Measuring 
Stability and Security in Iraq, which states that  
…the violence in Iraq cannot be categorized as the result of a single 
organized or unified opposition or insurgency; the security situation is 
currently at its most complex state since the initiation of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom… Conditions exist that could lead to civil war in Iraq…13 
In a manner reminiscent of Vietnam, public opinion polls reflect that, while the 
American public continues to support the overall war on terror, it has grown 
increasingly disenchanted with the war in Iraq. As in the Vietnam War, the 
argument can be made that the first strategic objective of the United States 
should be to direct its primary efforts against al Qaeda and other, similar, 
terrorist networks.  
The conceptual challenge for the United States in the war on terror will be to 
transform its current strategic approach away from industrial-age military 
concepts that focus primarily on conventional, symmetrical threats and 
responses suitable to maneuver-style warfare. Instead, it will need to develop 
information-age concepts that include the capability to deal with non-
conventional, asymmetrical threats employing network warfare. The practical 
challenge will be to address existing weaknesses and gaps in strategy, adapt to 
fundamental changes in the national security environment as it transforms from 
the industrial age to the information age, and develop a grand strategy for 
success. The nation must rise above the current military operations underway in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and embrace network concepts utilizing all the elements of 
national power on a truly global scale.   
The Vietnam War was an ideological struggle between a western industrialized 
world power and an Asian agrarian nation, fought using industrial-age methods 
and weapons. The war on terror is a war fought along cultural lines between a 
western information-age superpower and information-age non-state entities. It is 
being waged with methods and weapons that focus more on the power inherent 
in networked organizations and processes rather than military strength. 
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Information-age technology, which has eliminated concepts of time and distance, 
virtually guarantees that the war on terror will again be brought to U.S. soil, as it 
was on 9/11. The situation facing the nation, if it is to prevent or minimize this 
probable outcome, has been summarized by Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld: “Our challenge in this new century is a difficult one. It’s really to 
prepare to defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain and what we 
have to understand will be the unexpected. That may seem on the face of it an 
impossible task, but it is not.”14   
 
THE NEW STRATEGIC REALITY 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 introduced the United States to a new strategic 
reality, one that will continue to confront the nation in the information age. No 
longer can the U.S. rely on the conventional protections of time and distance as a 
result of being surrounded by vast oceans and air space. Instead, non-
conventional attacks may come with little or no notice, and they may be carried 
out against citizens and interests at home as well as abroad. In the war on terror, 
future attacks on the United States may originate from within as well as from 
outside the nation’s borders. 
Nor can the nation rely on the time between wars to reconstitute itself and 
focus on future threats. The new strategic reality, the context within which the 
nation finds itself fighting the war on terror, is similar to that in which the United 
States Army finds itself; a steady state of war is now the norm, and not the 
exception.15 It is a protracted and continuous war of finite conventional resources 
arrayed against infinite asymmetrical threats and capabilities, unlike any the 
nation, or the world, has ever faced. The implications of this new strategic reality 
are clear:  failure to understand the character of the threat and adapt accordingly 
will invite challenges to American political, economic, and military leadership 
throughout the world.   
  Figure 1, adapted and modified from the United States Army Posture 
Statement, reflects the Army’s view of the new strategic reality that confronts the 
United States today, as well as its dilemma. While most of the nation’s 
conventional military resources are postured to deal with traditional military 
threats, the more immediate and likely threat – to which the United States is 
more vulnerable, according to the Army – comes from unconventional threats 
from either state or non-state entities. These threats have been the focus of 
United States efforts since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Ultimately, the greatest 
immediate threats to the nation may not be military at all, but may come from 
non-state entities utilizing non-military methods to wage war. 
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Figure 1.   The New Strategic Reality.16      
 
Perhaps the most significant aspects of the new strategic reality are its persistent 
nature (resulting in a blurring of the familiar distinctions between war and 
peace), its potential for eliminating the distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants, and the erasure of the foreign-domestic divide. These are the by-
products of the information-age paradigm for waging war. The Department of 
Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006) acknowledges the nature of 
the new strategic reality in its opening statement: “The United States is a nation 
engaged in what will be a long war.”17 Military leaders and government officials 
have taken to calling the war on terror the “long war” in recognition that there is 
no apparent end in sight.18 
The implication is that, in the war on terror, there can be no time for a 
strategic pause to reset or to plan for the future, as there was in the past between 
wars or between campaigns. Instead, a perpetual reassessment of strategic gaps 
in preparedness and performance is necessary, while remaining engaged in the 
war. Traditionally, the strategic planning time horizon has been measured in 
months, years, and even decades. While this traditional approach may still be 
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minutes, and hours in which asymmetrical attacks can occur.  These timelines are 
incompatible and must be reconciled.   
Yet, more than four years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
many issues concerning the war on terror, and U.S. strategy in conducting it, 
remain in transition and continue to lack clarity and resolution. The issues that 
shape the war on terror are found in the lines of inquiry mentioned at the 
beginning of this article: issues of definition to achieve a focused national effort, 
issues of doctrine as a tool for shaping the national effort, issues of policy to guide 
the national effort, issues of strategy to accomplish the national effort, and issues 
of transformation of the national effort from the industrial age to the information 
age.   
 
Issues of Definition 
The lack of definition in the war on terror is problematic. While it allows national 
leaders the flexibility to define and redefine success in ways that suit political 
purposes, it also has potential drawbacks. From an operational perspective, it 
potentially leads to lack of clarity and understanding, and thus lack of focused 
national effort along with its attendant risk of failure. The very phrase “war on 
terror” lacks definition, and therefore presents the United States with a strategic 
issue that inhibits its efforts to prosecute the war effectively.  As multiple sources 
have indicated, “terror” is not the enemy. In the “war” on terror, neither terror 
nor terrorism can be defeated since terror is a method and terrorism is a tactic.  
From this perspective, neither terror nor terrorism takes on the characteristics of 
entities that can be defeated in the traditional sense.   
The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released by the White 
House, defined America’s enemy as “terrorism” in general.19 The 9/11 
Commission, perhaps recognizing the difficulty posed by the White House’s 
definition, provided a more precise description when it declared that “the enemy 
is not just ‘terrorism,’ some generic evil,” but must be the “threat posed by 
Islamist terrorism – especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its 
ideology.”20 However, even this clarification by the 9/11 Commission does not 
resolve the issue.  As Jason Burke notes, definitions are important. In Al-Qaeda: 
The True Story of Radical Islam, he points out that current definitions are 
subjective and, since terrorism is a tactic, the adoption by the United States of the 
phrase “war on terrorism” is nonsensical.21 From an operational perspective, it 
does not allow a precise description of the problem confronting the nation. Earl 
Tilford goes even further in The War on Terror: World War IV and establishes a 
link between definitions and strategy when he declares that, in the aftermath of 
the attacks of 9/11, when the Bush Administration labeled its efforts the “war” on 
terror, it made a basic and fundamental strategic error.22 From Tilford’s 
perspective, the error is so grave that it places the United States in the position of 
fighting a war that it could lose, similar to Vietnam, because it has misjudged the 
nature of its opponent. 
It is notable that the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and 
the 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism use 
identical wording in defining the enemy as “a transnational movement of 
extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-
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state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use 
terrorism for ideological ends.”23 This definition continues to restrict the 
definition of the enemy by assigning it a connection to Islam. It also applies a 
mixed metaphor by establishing a connection between radical Islam – which is 
essentially a religion – and political ideological philosophies (rather than 
religious philosophies, which are cultural). Neither the White House, nor the 
Department of Defense, nor the 9/11 Commission adequately addresses non-state 
entities (whether domestic or transnational in origin) not connected to Islam. In 
the information age these networks represent a potential threat to the nation as 
great as that currently posed by al Qaeda. 
Lack of definition further complicates efforts to come to grips with the entity 
known as “al Qaeda.” If al Qaeda represents the primary, or at least the most 
visible, opponent of the United States in the war on terror, its precise nature 
remains unclear. Depending on the source, al Qaeda is either a terrorist group,24 
a stateless network of terrorists that represents a radical movement in the Islamic 
world,25 a venture capitalist firm that sponsors a terror network of networks,26 or 
not a terrorist group at all but a worldwide insurgency.27 Understanding the 
nature of al Qaeda is critical if the U.S. is to develop a clear strategy against it. 
Conventional strategic thinking calls for identifying and attacking an enemy’s 
centers of gravity. Each of the various definitions of al Qaeda invokes a different 
strategy; failure on the part of the United States to employ the correct strategic 
approach invites failure overall. Ultimately, in order to prevail against al Qaeda as 
a precursor to success in the war on terror, it may be necessary to accept several 
conditions: that al Qaeda is a non-state entity that possesses elements of each of 
the definitions above; that it is constantly evolving its methods, tactics, and 
philosophy, i.e., the very essence of what it is; that it is very successful in 
attracting adherents; and that it may represent the forerunner of both terrorism 
and warfare in the information age.  In this sense conventional strategic thinking 
may not be effective against al Qaeda. 
The definition of victory, or even success, in the war on terror is also 
problematic. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism establishes 
this when it states: “The long-term solution for winning the war on terror is the 
advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy.” 28 The 
means to be used by the United States to advance democracy are not clear.  How 
will the United States know when it has advanced democracy far enough that it 
can declare victory in the war on terror? The implication of this definition is that 
it offers no definable end state, no reasonable expectation that the war on terror 
can be brought to a conclusion. As a matter of practicality, it may not be possible 
to defeat or eliminate terrorist groups entirely. The strategic alternatives of 
rollback or containment of terrorism may be more feasible.29 
A final definition that poses difficulty for the United States is the legal status of 
its adversaries. Are individuals who carry out terrorist acts against the U.S. and 
its interests criminals or armed combatants? The difference is critical in crafting 
a wartime strategy that bridges the foreign-domestic divide defined by the 9/11 
Commission.30 A primary example is the legal status of the al Qaeda detainees 
held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the 
United States develop a coalition approach for the detention and humane 
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treatment of captured transnational terrorists, possibly structured on Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions on the law of armed conflict. This is at least tacit 
acknowledgment that the detainees are recognized as armed combatants and 
should be accorded some of the protections of the Geneva Conventions.31   
However, in a decision that was issued nearly simultaneously with the release 
of The 9/11 Commission Report, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 2004 
that detainees at Guantanamo Bay can take their cases (that they are unlawfully 
imprisoned) to the American court system.32 The Court further reinforced its 
position in 2006 when it ruled against Bush Administration efforts to conduct 
war crimes trials for some detainees at Guantanamo Bay.33 The impact of the 
Court’s rulings is that they call into question whether the United States is legally 
at war, or pursuing a law enforcement action. By offering the protection of the 
United States legal system to the detainees, it appears that the Supreme Court 
does not recognize the war on terror as a war according to legal and historical 
definitions. 
As indicated above, many of the issues that currently affect the war on terror 
can be traced to lack of definition, lack of clarity, and a diffused rather than 
focused effort. This has the benefit of allowing policy makers to maintain 
flexibility in defining and re-defining success in many ways. However, it poses 
great difficulty in developing effective strategy and conducting focused 
operations. Lack of definition also affects, for good or bad, the application of 
doctrine, policy, and transformation concepts to the war on terror.  
 
Issues of Doctrine 
The war metaphor terror renders U.S. efforts subject to analysis by the doctrinal 
rules of war. Contemporary United States doctrine for fighting wars derives its 
foundation – its “rules of grammar” – from the writings of nineteenth-century 
Prussian General Carl Philipp Gotlieb von Clausewitz, particularly his seminal 
thesis, On War.34 Published posthumously in 1831, On War continues to shape 
current American military thinking and remains the authority on the essence of 
war. It is considered by many to be the greatest work on war and strategy ever 
produced by Western civilization, and its key concepts can be used to put current 
efforts in the war on terror in perspective.   
In his chapter on war as an instrument of policy, Clausewitz writes that “war’s 
grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.”35 By invoking the logic of war 
in declaring the “war” on terror the United States committed itself to its rules of 
grammar, or means. Tilford explains Clausewitz’s concept of grammar in the 
following way: 
The logic [nature] of war, violence directed by political intent, remains 
constant but the grammar [character] changes. Logic is a constant 
regardless of age, sex, ethnicity, nationality or cultural factors. On the 
other hand, how one addresses a particular problem or issue, the methods 
used, is subject to a large number of factors such as age, sex, physical 
condition, resources, culture, religious beliefs and values. Applied to war, 
there is then a distinctly American way of war that differs significantly 
from the way Chinese or Russians or Zulus make war. There is also a 
distinctly Muslim fundamentalist way of making war. Clausewitz’s point is 
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that although nations and groups make war in different ways based on a 
large number of factors, they go to war for one logical reason only: to 
force an enemy to do their will.36   
The first concept that Clausewitz offers is his definition of war as “an act of force 
to compel our enemy to do our will.”37 From the vantage point of Clausewitz’s 
definition, the war on terror is not unique and it would be a mistake to view it in 
any other strategic context. First, Clausewitz’s definition of war can be broken 
into three elements: the effort is directed toward an identified opponent; it 
involves violence or use of force to compel our opponent to fulfill our will; and 
(by implication) we know our national will. The war on terror does not present a 
new problem from Clausewitz’s logical perspective; it is merely a modern 
application of an ancient concept. 
Second, Clausewitz declared that all wars could be considered acts of policy. It 
is absolutely essential, therefore, that: 
[t]he first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the 
statesman and the commander have to make is to establish by that test 
the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor 
trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first 
of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.38 
To understand the true nature of the war on terror requires not only a refined 
definition of the enemy, but also a knowledge and comprehension of the nature of 
the war itself. For the United States to stray from this principle, again, invites 
failure.   
This leads to a third principle established by Clausewitz, that of the political 
objective. To paraphrase, the political object is the goal, war is the means for 
reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.39 
Only upon establishment of the objective of the war can a strategy be devised to 
achieve it. Following the logic of Clausewitz, if al Qaeda is the most visible enemy 
in the war on terror, and perhaps the forerunner of adversary networks in the 
information age, then the United States must understand the nature of al Qaeda, 
as well as the nature of its conflict with al Qaeda. It can then develop clearly 
defined, decisive, and attainable objectives, with attendant strategies to prevail 
against al Qaeda. Lack of clarity of strategic objectives, in the long-term, has the 
potential to lead to a wearing-down of American resolve, which can ultimately 
lead to failure. This is evocative of the lack of clarity of strategic objectives, 
described very clearly and eloquently by Harry Summers, that contributed to 
America’s failure in Vietnam.40 
Clausewitz proposed two additional sets of concepts that offer insight into the 
war on terror: fog and friction, and efforts that constitute preparations for war 
versus war proper. The concept of “fog” in war refers to the uncertainty of the 
information available to the commander.41  Uncertainty can make problems 
seem, without perspective, larger than they really are. In the absence of 
information, that which is unknown is left to chance. “Friction” is the idea that 
“everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult,” and that 
difficulties accumulate.42 Clausewitz envisioned an army as a very simple 
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machine, but with a multitude of moving parts, each of which retains its 
independent capability to generate friction.   
Both fog and friction can be observed throughout the war on terror. The effects 
of fog can be found in the lack of clarity of information that exists at the policy, 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of effort. Friction can be observed in the 
homeland security related interagency conflicts between international, federal, 
state, local, tribal, and private agencies.  Both fog and friction have impacted the 
strategic gaps that exist between agencies such as that between the Department 
of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense; in the foreign-domestic 
divide described by the 9/11 Commission; in the lack of interoperability between 
agencies at all levels nationwide; and in the failure to share intelligence across 
agency boundaries. Examples of fog and friction abound in the war on terror.  
Finally, Clausewitz said that, “The activities of war may be split into two main 
categories: those that are merely preparation for war, and [those that 
constitute] war proper.” Preparations for war produce “the end product,” trained 
and equipped fighting forces. War proper “on the other hand, is concerned with 
the use of these means, once they have been developed, for the purposes of 
[waging] the war.”43 The purpose of war is presumed to be the imposition of one’s 
will upon the enemy. Similarly, the application of effort to the war on terror 
should be divided into those activities that are preparations for war and those 
that are the conduct of the war proper. Both activities are necessary, but each 
should be considered separately and not confused one for the other when 
evaluating success. Nor can they be separated from objective and strategy. 
The outcome of the Vietnam War is an example of what can occur when 
preparations for war and war proper are confused with objective and strategy. In 
referring to the United States defeat in Vietnam, Summers asks the question, 
“How could we have succeeded so well [tactically and logistically], yet failed so 
miserably [strategically]?”44 He opens his analysis of the Vietnam War with this 
declaration: 
At the height of the war, the Army was able to move almost a million 
soldiers a year in and out of Vietnam, feed them, clothe them, house 
them, supply them with arms and ammunition, and generally sustain 
them better than any Army had ever been sustained in the field. To 
project an Army of that size halfway around the world was a logistics and 
management task of enormous magnitude, and we had been more than 
equal to the task. On the battlefield itself, the Army was unbeatable.  In 
engagement after engagement, the forces of the Viet Cong and of the 
North Vietnamese Army were thrown back, with terrible losses. Yet in the 
end it was North Vietnam, not the United States, that emerged 
victorious.45 
The Army’s accomplishments in Vietnam could not have been carried out without 
the application of preparations for war on a large scale.  In essence, the Army did 
everything it was designed to do in Vietnam, but its successes did not lead to 
victory. The failure can be viewed in two ways.  First, the activities that 
constituted preparations for war, e.g. logistics, personnel, and resource 
management, were not always distinguished from war proper, resulting in 
misdirection of priorities. The result was a systems analysis approach to the 
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Vietnam War that overrode strategic planning. More importantly, both 
preparations for war and war proper were directed toward a flawed objective and 
strategy. Regardless of the success of the military effort, it was in support of a 
flawed national objective and strategy that doomed the overall effort to ultimate 
strategic failure. The negative effects of its strategic failure in Vietnam produced a 
lingering effect on the United States, both in its institutions and the American 
public, which remains today. The durability of the potential negative effects of 
strategic failure in the war on terror are visible in the current debate in public 
forums on the nature and implications of the perceived threat to the nation. 
How does the United States avoid making a similar mistake in the war on 
terror? Much of the current homeland security effort in the war on terror – e.g. 
reorganization of government, critical infrastructure protection, and scenario-
based planning – are defensive actions that take on the guise of preparations for 
war. They do not, in and of themselves, directly impose America’s will on al 
Qaeda or any other adversary. It is not certain that they are even effective 
deterrents. Only those offensive diplomatic, information, military, law 
enforcement, and economic actions that do apply force directly to terrorist 
adversaries, to force them to accept the will of the United States, are examples of 
war proper. In the final analysis, it will be necessary for the United States to 
ensure that its efforts, both those that constitute preparation for war, as well as 
those that constitute war proper, are directed toward clearly defined, decisive and 
attainable national objectives and facilitated by a clear and effective strategy for 
success.  This will require a transformation of strategic thought. U.S. war-fighting 
doctrine, founded in Clausewitzean principles of war between nation states, must 
be adapted in order to prevail against non-state entities. 
 
Issues of Policy 
In the realm of policy, first and foremost, the question must be asked: Is the 
United States truly “at war” in the war on terror? The determinations of the 9/11 
Commission Report indicate that the United States is in popular deed, if not in 
legal fact, a nation at war, and lead to the Commission’s recommendations for 
establishing national objectives and a national strategy for conducting the war on 
terror.46 The findings of the 9/11 Commission meet two of the three critical 
elements in Clausewitz’s military-political definition of war. First, the effort is 
directed toward an identified opponent and, second, it involves violence or use of 
force to compel our opponent to fulfill our will. According to the 9/11 
Commission the United States’ opponent in the war on terror consists of the 
terrorist groups and their allies, particularly the global al Qaeda network, that 
form the threat of Islamist terrorism, thereby satisfying the first element of war: 
an effort directed at an identified opponent.47 Although there are problems with 
this definition, particularly that it falls short of defining the full scope of the 
threat to the United States, it represents a start in developing a national objective 
and strategy. The use of American and allied forces to find and destroy terrorist 
groups, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, partially fulfills the second 
element of war: the use of violence or force to compel our opponent to meet our 
will.48 The unresolved issue is whether the insurgent groups in Afghanistan and 
Iraq are the right enemy, at the right time, and in the right place. 
REED, WHY STRATEGY MATTERS 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME II, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2006) http://www.hsaj.org  
12 
The third element in Clausewitz’s military-political definition of war - that we 
know our national will - is partially satisfied by Public Laws 107-40 and 107-243. 
These laws, from a legal perspective, do not constitute a formal declaration of 
war. However, they give the President broad powers to prosecute the effort that 
has come to be known popularly as the war on terror. Under the provisions of 
Public Law 107-40, the President is authorized to use force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons who planned and carried out the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, and those who harbored them, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.49 
Public Law 107-243 authorizes the President to use the armed forces of the 
United States to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq, and to enforce 
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.50 Based on these 
laws the first component of the national will – the political will of the United 
States – is presumed to be established, even without a formal declaration of war. 
The second element of the national will, the public will, remains uncertain. 
This raises a number of policy issues in the war on terror. The rules for 
invoking the national will are embedded in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, which gives to Congress the power to declare war. A declaration of 
war – to establish the national will – therefore becomes a shared responsibility 
between the political will of the government and the popular will of its 
constituents.  This is more than just a formality: Failure by Congress to declare 
war in Vietnam led to a failure to mobilize the second element of the national 
will, the popular will of the public, and ultimately contributed to the U.S. defeat. 
A declaration of war gives the President clear-cut military authority, as well as 
non-military options, including internment of armed combatants and seizure of 
foreign funds and assets. A formal declaration of war in the war on terror might 
have precluded the Supreme Court’s decision to grant detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay access to the protections of the judicial system. Further, according to William 
F. Buckley: 
To declare war is not necessarily to dispatch troops, let alone atom 
bombs. It is to recognize a juridically altered relationship and to license 
such action as is deemed appropriate. It is a wonderful demystifier… 
[leaving] your objective in very plain view.51 
An acknowledgement of the need to establish objectives in the war on terror, and 
to develop a strategy to achieve those objectives, is found in the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendation that the United States should “consider what to 
do – the shape and objects of a strategy,” and “how to do it – organization of 
[the] government in a different way.”52 The Commission’s recommended 
objectives are to attack terrorists and their organizations, prevent the continued 
growth of Islamist terrorism, and protect against and prepare for terrorist 
attacks. The Commission says the strategy must incorporate offensive actions, 
with coalition partners, to counter terrorism; defensive actions with 
responsibilities for the nation’s defense clearly defined; a preventive strategy that 
is both political as well as military; and, finally, a responsive strategy that deals 
with attacks that are not prevented. Finally, the Commission recognized that if a 
national strategy is to be successful in the long-term, it must use all the elements 
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of national power: intelligence, covert action, diplomacy, economic policy, foreign 
aid, and homeland defense.53 From its recommendations it appears that the 9/11 
Commission is suggesting a single overarching strategy for the United States in 
the war on terror. 
 
Issues of Strategy 
Issues of strategy can be found in the proliferation of national strategies, of which 
there are no fewer than twenty addressing various aspects of the war on terror. 
These strategies deal with the problems of homeland security, homeland defense, 
and the war on terror in piecemeal fashion, resulting in an approach that thus far 
is fragmented in its organization and disjointed in its application. A reading of 
the various national strategies does not render a clear understanding of overall  
policy, objectives, or strategy. History, in the form of the lessons learned in 
Vietnam, dictates that a failure of national strategy has the potential to lead to an 
overall failure in the war on terror. Strategic issues are illustrated in the two 
national strategies that come closest to offering a grand strategy that creates an 
overarching umbrella for the other national strategies: the National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America and the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security. 
The 2002 National Security Strategy pre-dates, but broadly parallels, the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission regarding what the United States 
should do (employ all the elements of national power) and how it should do it 
(transform the major institutions of American national security to meet the 
requirements of the post-9/11 era).54 The 2006 version reinforces the original 
tenets from 2002 and lists examples of progress made in the past four years. It 
reserves the option of preemptive actions to disrupt and destroy terrorist 
organizations with global reach. In this sense, it forms a loose overarching 
strategy to secure the United States against terrorist attack. It defines America’s 
enemy as terrorism and terrorist networks in general, but it makes the 
fundamental strategic error espoused by Tilford, in that it does not clearly 
identify the enemy, nor national objectives regarding that enemy.55   
In its language, the 2006 National Security Strategy may contribute 
inadvertently to the motivations of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. It clearly 
states that “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic 
movements and institutions in every nation and culture.”56 In Imperial Hubris: 
Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, Michael Scheuer argues that it is 
precisely American policies and actions of the past thirty years in Muslim 
nations, including pressure to conform to democratic principles, that have lead to 
the war on terror. American policies and actions “provide Muslims with proof of 
what bin Laden describes as ‘an ocean of oppression, injustice, slaughter, and 
plunder carried out by you against our Islamic ummah. It is therefore 
commanded by our religion that we must fight back.  We are defending ourselves 
against the United States. This is a ‘defensive jihad’ as we want to protect our 
land and people.’”57 Scheuer supports this argument with public opinion polls in 
the Muslim world, which indicate an overwhelmingly negative view of the United 
States.58  
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Whether democracy is a clear and obtainable objective in the war on terror is 
questionable. In Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World, Ralph Peters 
takes the position that “Democracy must be earned and learned. It cannot be 
decreed from without. In a grim paradox, our [United States] insistence on 
instant democracy in shattered states…is our greatest contribution to global 
instability.”59 Efforts to impose democracy on other sovereign nations may be 
perceived by those nations and their cultures as the ultimate example of 
American hubris. This may be a causal factor in members of other cultures 
responding to calls for war against the United States. 
The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security also predates the 9/11 
Commission Report.60 Its stated purpose, “to mobilize and organize the nation to 
secure the homeland from terrorist attacks,” seems to be a goal that would be 
more applicable to the National Security Strategy.61 Its objectives – preventing 
terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and response and recovery to terrorist attacks – are focused inward on 
domestic preparations and constitute a primarily defensive and preventive 
strategy. It is an example of what Summers describes as taking the strategic 
defensive, which led to United States defeat in Vietnam.62 Much of what it 
prescribes for homeland security also conforms to Clausewitz’s definition of 
preparations for war instead of the conduct of war proper. It does not provide 
an objective or a strategy for offensive actions to counter terrorism, to preempt it 
at United States borders, or for taking the strategic offensive in the war on terror. 
In its current form, the National Strategy for Homeland Security provides a 
good blueprint for the Department of Homeland Security but, despite having a 
segment devoted to American federalism and homeland security, it does not 
provide any authority for directing how the various federal agencies are to work 
in synchronization to prosecute the war on terror. Ultimately, in its call for the 
implementation of homeland security measures costing hundreds of billions of 
dollars, it may serve al Qaeda’s strategic objective of bleeding the United States 
economy as a means of defeating American resolve.63 Ironically, al Qaeda’s 
strategic objective is similar to that employed by the United States when it bled 
the economy of the former Soviet Union into bankruptcy in the Cold War arms 
race. 
The nature of the war on terror – against the unknown, the uncertain, and the 
unexpected, as Rumsfeld indicated – makes strategic thinking difficult. The 
proliferation of national strategies that partition the war on terror into segments 
further complicates the effort. An example of how this occurs is in Clausewitz, 
Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, in which Alan Beyerchen includes 
a discussion of the way chance is associated with Clausewitz’s concept of the fog 
of uncertainty in war, which obscures or distorts most of the factors on which 
action is based.64 According to Beyerchen, chance as a function of analytical 
blindness, as described by the late 19th century mathematician Henri Poincaré 
and displayed in Clausewitz’s work, results in an inability to see the universe as 
an interconnected whole. To paraphrase Beyerchen’s argument and apply it to 
the war on terror: The inability to see the war on terror in its entirety has resulted 
in multiple national strategies that break it down into segments more easily dealt 
with. Yet it happens that these segments interact and the effects of this 
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interaction seem to be due to chance. The result is that the effort to comprehend 
the war on terror through analysis, the effort to partition off pieces of it to make 
them individually amenable to strategic thought, creates the possibility of being 
blindsided by the partitioning process. 
According to Beyerchen, Clausewitz had a profound sense of how the 
understanding of phenomena – in this case the war on terror – is truncated by 
the bounds placed on it for analytical convenience. Clausewitz stressed the failure 
of theorists to develop effective principles because they insist on isolating 
individual factors or aspects of the problems presented in war. Beyerchen quotes 
Clausewitz to illustrate his point: 
Efforts were therefore made to equip the conduct of war with principles, 
rules, or even systems. This did present a positive goal, but people failed 
to take an adequate account of the endless complexities involved.  As we 
have seen, the conduct of war branches out in all directions and has no 
definite limits; while any system, any model, has the finite nature of a 
synthesis….[these attempts] aim at fixed values; but in war everything is 
uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. They 
[theorists] direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, 
whereas all military action is entwined with psychological forces and 
effects. They [theorists] consider only unilateral action, whereas war 
consists of continuous interaction of opposites.65 
This is not to indicate that strategy in the war on terror is without value: quite the 
opposite.  While strategy as a plan, or product, is problematic (as indicated in the 
preceding discussion), strategy as process brings great value. Strategy as process 
brings together often disparate elements to understand and confront a war that is 
in many ways at odds with historical record. The issue for the United States is 
how it will transform its strategic processes to meet the requirements of the 
information age. 
 
Issues of Transformation 
A growing body of literature, including such authors as Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
Huntington, Kaplan, Hammes, and van Creveld, suggests that future war will 
move away from the principles of conventional trinitarian war (conducted 
between warring nation states and founded on the relationship between the 
trinity of each state’s government, army and people) established by Clausewitz.66 
It will be replaced by modern, non-trinitarian war between state and non-state 
entities organized as networks along social, economic, criminal, terrorist, gang, 
special interest, and ethnic lines to name but a few. It will take on the 
characteristics of war without national boundaries, where the distinctions 
between public and private, government and people, military and civilian – i.e., 
combatants and noncombatants – will again become blurred as they were prior to 
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.67 Arthur Cebrowski describes the change, as it 
relates to war, in the following way: 
Warfare, conflict, and instability are inherent features of our world.  
Warfare is a pattern of human behavior that spans recorded history. The 
nature [what Clausewitz referred to as “logic”] of warfare, and conflict 
between nations and states is fundamentally unchanging – it is organized 
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force for political ends. However, because war is both a political action 
and a social institution, the character [what Clausewitz referred to as 
“grammar”] of warfare is changing just as societies, political entities and 
technologies change.68   
Against this backdrop the war on terror, an existential war of ideas, has been 
called “the first great war between nations and networks.”69 Five years after the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States’ ongoing involvement in the 
simultaneous conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and against the global al Qaeda 
insurgency, represents a juncture for the nation that continues to severely test its 
political and public will. At the same time, it must move beyond its traditional 
industrial-age approach to warfare and prepare to engage adversaries both in 
new forms and in new domains of conflict. In short, it must redefine its strategic 
canvas.  
The premise of this approach is that America’s future adversaries, whether 
they take the form of terrorist or other types of networks, are not invincible. In 
fact, their structures and operations can be very fragile and certainly can be 
defeated. However, it is necessary to move away from the inductive Cold War 
approach of the past fifty years – looking for weaknesses, gaps, and deficiencies, 
and determining how to exploit them – and toward deductive thinking and an 
adaptive capabilities-based approach in the war on terror – a conscious search 
for the unexpected and the outer bounds of feasibility.70 
The key tenet of this approach, as shown in the strategic transformation 
canvas in Figure 2, is that transformation from industrial-age concepts and 
methods to information-age concepts and methods is essential to long-term 
success in the war on terror and beyond. The emergence of al Qaeda as the likely 
forerunner of terrorist and other types of networks in the information age will 
drive strategic transformation from industrial-age domains of conflict (land, air, 
maritime, space, and cyber) to information-age domains of conflict (physical, 
informational, cognitive, and social). Traditional concepts of waging warfare 
against an adversary’s centers of gravity will be replaced with a focus on the 
elimination of critical systems, nodes, and links of information-age networks. 
Network warfare will replace conventional warfare in the information age as both 
nation states and non-state entities come to realize its dialectical advantages.  
The current operational paradigm employed by the United States in the war on 
terror evolved from the experience of its military during the industrial-scale wars 
of the twentieth century. It is rooted in industrial-age concepts that focus on 
conventional, symmetrical threats and responses, and hierarchical command and 
control. It is geographically based across territory and space. Its standard for 
defending the United States against external threats is a layered defense across 
the operational domains that comprise the industrial-age global commons – the 
land, air, maritime, cyber, and space domains. 
This paradigm is based on the concept that an active, layered, and 
comprehensive defense is necessary if the United States is to detect, deter, 
prevent, and defeat threats as early and as far from its borders as possible and to 
recover from them when they do occur. Its primary weakness is that it presumes  
attacks will originate outside the homeland and be conducted in a conventional 
manner. It presumes military force will always be the first line of defense. 
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However, as stated above, the information age will see the end of conventional 
warfare. The overwhelming battlefield successes of the United States military in 
the Persian Gulf wars (1991, 1993) have initiated the demise of large-scale 
maneuver warfare by illustrating its limitations. The reaction in many corners of 
the world is that there are no nations still capable of sustaining the costs of 
competition with the United States in conventional warfare.71 Instead of relying 
on military force to wage war, strong and weak nations alike will find other ways 
to wage war, in other domains, by redefining the strategic canvas. Further, this 
development will not be limited to nation states, but will also be available to non-
state entities and networks, including super-empowered individuals and groups.   
The emerging information age paradigm is a network-centric approach based 
on the premise that a fundamental shift in power has occurred from industry to 
information. It is rooted in information-age concepts that focus on non-
conventional, asymmetrical threats and responses, and non-hierarchical 
command and control. It expands beyond the geographical base of territory and 
space. Its standard for defending the United States against both internal and 
external threats is a universally networked defense across the operational 
domains that comprise the information-age global commons – the physical, 
information, cognitive, and social domains. Network-centric operations seek to 
create an information advantage and translate it into an operational advantage. 
This approach accepts that military force, while essential, may be neither the first 
nor the most significant line of defense. The information-age domains are defined 
as:72 
Physical – the traditional domain of warfare where a force is moved 
through time and space. It includes the land, sea, air, and space realms. 
Information – the domain where information is created, manipulated, 
and shared. It includes the cyber realm. 
Cognitive – the domain where intent, strategy, doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures reside. It is the domain where decisive 
concepts and tactics emerge. 
Social – the domain which comprises the necessary elements of any 
human enterprise. It is where humans interact, exchange information, 
form shared awareness and understandings, and make collaborative 
decisions. It is also the domain of culture, values, attitudes, and beliefs, 
and where political decisions are made. 
The strategic transformation canvas in Figure 2 draws on business concepts of 
strategy to demonstrate the transformation of warfare that must occur.73 As the 
canvas indicates, in the industrial age large and small powers compete for the 
same thing – conventional military supremacy in the physical and cyber domains 
that comprise the industrial-age global commons. Relative advantage or 
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Figure 2.   The Strategic Transformation Canvas.74 
 
Al Qaeda, as a forerunner of terrorist networks and non-state entities in the 
information age, rejects the logic of trying to compete with conventional military 
forces. As a non-state entity it lacks the necessary resources to employ 
conventional warfare in order to achieve its strategic objectives. Instead, it seeks 
to redefine its strategic canvas and to make conventional warfare irrelevant by 
embracing an information-age paradigm for warfare. It seeks to leverage the shift 
in power from industry to information. In so doing, it tries to avoid conventional 
warfare in the physical and cyber domains of the industrial-age global commons; 
it seeks instead to transfer the conflict to the domains of the information-age 
global commons where it can compete by employing its asymmetrical strengths 
to its advantage.    
The implication of the strategic transformation canvas is that all participants, 
greater and lesser powers alike, including nation states and non-state entities, 
will be able to acquire infinite capabilities and compete on equal terms in the 
information-age domains. However, scale can still play a decisive role in 
achieving and maintaining the strategic advantage. The United States can retain a 
significant advantage by adopting a strategic approach similar to that of al Qaeda 
and other potential adversaries, and by leveraging the shift in power from 
industry to information. This will allow it to bring to bear all the elements of its 
national power in the information domains, while continuing to use superior 
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resources and knowledge capacity to develop strategies to overcome non-state 
entities such as al Qaeda. The war on terror, and conflicts that follow, will be won 
or lost in the domains of the information-age global commons. 
 
CONCLUSION: ON INSTITUTIONALIZING IMAGINATION 
In its report, the 9/11 Commission concluded that the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
revealed four kinds of American failure, foremost among them a failure in 
imagination.75 In this failure the Commission states that “Imagination is not a gift 
usually associated with bureaucracies….It is therefore crucial to find a way of 
routinizing, even bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination.”76 This assertion is 
followed by a chapter on global strategy and a concluding chapter offering 
recommendations on reorganizing the federal government in order to achieve 
unity of effort in securing the nation against future attacks.77   
However, when considered against the war metaphor adopted by the United 
States after 9/11, the simple reorganization of government – the re-ordering of 
existing departments and functions – is insufficient both as a means to secure the 
nation and as a means to prepare it to conduct the war on terror and any conflicts 
that follow it in the information age. Instead, true institutionalization of 
imagination can be found in the transformation – a redefinition of form and 
function using deductive reasoning – of government. Writing nearly a year after 
the 9/11 attacks John Arquilla provides a more accurate description of the nature 
of the problem confronting the United States: 
In the last year, our defense posture has shifted. We used to be focused 
exclusively on nations; now we are also focused on networks. Networks 
like Al Qaeda are dangerous adversaries. They have loose, difficult-to-
trace organizational structures. Vigorous efforts must be made to connect 
the dots of the network and its various dark allies. Yet, for all our new 
focus on winkling out networked terror, we seem to have learned few 
lessons about the nature of "netwar”… 
Our leadership and, indeed, most other leaders around the world are 
new to this type of warfare. Clearly, the most important step they all can 
take right now is to learn all they can about networks and network-style 
conflict. Raising their level of awareness would open up the possibility of 
waging this war in new ways, rather than continuing to stumble along in a 
more traditional and ineffectual fashion.78 
This article arrives at a similar conclusion. The issues of definition, doctrine, 
policy, strategy, and transformation are not merely academic but will remain 
central to success in the war on terror. They are strategic in nature and must be 
addressed if the United States, in the application of its “war” metaphor, is to first 
avoid the strategic mistakes that lead to defeat in Vietnam and, second, 
simultaneously transform its strategic canvas for the information age.   
The overall effort has already raised questions in academic and military circles 
over whether current doctrines of war, especially those based in Clausewitzean 
theory, have become irrelevant. Clausewitz’s philosophy of war, his description of 
the essence of war and its immutable principles, is broad enough to remain 
relevant, but it must be adapted to the information age. His definition of war as 
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“an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” remains valid but its 
elements must transform. 
   The nature, or logic, of war – the use of force to compel an opponent to one’s 
will – has not changed. From this perspective the United States must arrive at a 
clearer definition of its adversaries and define its objectives and strategy, 
pursuant to these adversaries, in obtainable terms. This is necessary for the war 
metaphor the nation has chosen to pursue. 
War’s character, or grammar, however, will take on a new form in the domains 
of the information-age global commons. It becomes necessary to redefine 
success, which may or may not be defeat or victory over one’s enemy in the 
traditional sense. The definition of force and the means to apply it to achieve 
success must also be redefined to include means of force that are outside, or go 
beyond, military force alone as envisioned by Clausewitz. In the end, rollback and 
containment of terrorist organizations through disruption of the processes that 
enable them to operate as networks, thereby rendering them irrelevant, may 
replace concepts of victory and defeat. The stakes are high. The alternative, if the 
United States fails to exercise imagination to define the strategic terms of the war 
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